Human relations are driven by social events—people interact, exchange information, share knowledge and emotions, and gather news from mass media. These events leave traces in human memory, the strength of which depends on cognitive factors such as emotions or attention span. Each trace continuously weakens over time unless another related event activity strengthens it. Here, we introduce a novel cognition-driven social network model that accounts for cognitive aspects of social perception. The model explicitly represents each social interaction as a trace (...) in human memory with its corresponding dynamics. The strength of the trace is the only measure of the influence that the interactions had on a person. For validation, we apply our model to NetSense data on social interactions among university students. The results show that CogSNet significantly improves the quality of modeling of human interactions in social networks. (shrink)

Students in 80 kindergarten to grade six classrooms photographed and captioned experiences in class which they identified as examples of democratic citizenship education. With the assistance of a teacher candidate placed in their classroom for a semester, students chose and captioned five of the photographs they considered to best represent demonstrate citizenship education. Four main categories of citizenship events emerged describing key elements associated with democratic citizenship education; shared decision making, participating in a learner-oriented classroom context in which students have (...) some individual choice of daily activities, equality of opportunity, and activities extending into the community and integrating community and classroom. Early grades students (K-3) identified activities they associated with democratic citizenship education while upper grades (4-6) students additionally presented rationales and gave evidence to support their representations. Empowerment, problem solving, and contributing to the common good were additional elements associated with democratic citizenship education in the classes sampled, although these were not strongly represented as were the four key elements. This study provides an initial portrait indicating a need for deeper investigation of K-6 students' own representations of the democratic citizenship education they experience. (shrink)

Students in 80 kindergarten to grade six classrooms photographed and captioned experiences in class which they identified as examples of democratic citizenship education. With the assistance of a teacher candidate placed in their classroom for a semester, students chose and captioned five of the photographs they considered to best represent demonstrate citizenship education. Four main categories of citizenship events emerged describing key elements associated with democratic citizenship education; shared decision making, participating in a learner-oriented classroom context in which students have (...) some individual choice of daily activities, equality of opportunity, and activities extending into the community and integrating community and classroom. Early grades students (K-3) identified activities they associated with democratic citizenship education while upper grades (4-6) students additionally presented rationales and gave evidence to support their representations. Empowerment, problem solving, and contributing to the common good were additional elements associated with democratic citizenship education in the classes sampled, although these were not strongly represented as were the four key elements. This study provides an initial portrait indicating a need for deeper investigation of K-6 students' own representations of the democratic citizenship education they experience. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan presented a paradigm of the social contract that has proven foundational in Western political thought. A proper understanding of the philosopher’s thought is thus of paramount importance. I argue that today’s case for a religiously tolerant Hobbes has missed an important part of the historical record. I first consider an obscure but important document, the second edition of the Humble Proposals. It demonstrates that leading members of a seventeenth century Christian denomination, the Independents, considered a state-enforced (...) confession of faith. Independents are generally seen as tolerant, and one of the arguments for Hobbesian toleration is that Hobbes endorsed them. But the second edition of the Humble Proposals aligns with the possibility in Hobbes that the civil sovereign will impose part III of Leviathan on the Universities and treat its contents as a legally required confession of faith – one that may be necessary for security, and the avoidance of civil war. Hobbes’s endorsement of Independency alone cannot be used to argue that his work leads to religious toleration. The evidence I present reinforces an earlier assessment and alongside other evidence points to the return of the intolerant Hobbes. (shrink)

Most comparisons of Thomas Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza focus on the difference in understanding of natural right. We argue that Hobbes also places more weight on a rudimentary and exclusive education of the public by the state. We show that the difference is related to deeper disagreements over the prospect of Enlightenment. Hobbes is more sanguine than Spinoza about using the state to make people rational. Spinoza considers misguided an overemphasis on publicly educating everyone out of superstition—public education is important, (...) but modes of superstition may remain and must be offset by institutions and a civil religion. The differences are confirmed by Spinoza’s interest in the philosopher who stands apart and whose flourishing may be protected, but not simply brought about, by rudimentary public education. Spinoza’s openness to a wisdom-loving elite in a democracy also sets up an interesting parallel with Thomas Jefferson’s own commitment to the natural aristocracy needed to sustain republicanism. In demonstrating the 17th century philosopher’s skepticism toward using the state exclusively to promote rationality, even as he recognizes the importance of a sovereign pedagogical role and the protection of philosophy, we move to suggest that Spinoza is relevant to contemporary debates about public education and may reinvigorate moral and political discourse in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

The aim of the studies was to ascertain how far psychology students are ready to learn the vocation of education assistants to children and youth. Four general ways of acquiring knowledge and skills - by assimilation, by doing, by discovering, and by impression - were distinguished and interpreted with regard to the students’ prospective employment in educational institutions. Learning by doing and by impression turned out to be more expressive in the student self-reports than learning by assimilation and by discovering. (...) A proof that the Nosal/paluchowski typology of diagnosticians applies to psychology students was also in search. However, the pertinent Educational Diagnostician Inventory appeared satisfactorily valid only for those psychology sophomores who manifested the best-shaped attitudes towards educational diagnoses. They belonged mostly to concrete-objective and global-subjective attitude categories. Transactional analysis partly supported these findings of the survey. (shrink)

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for (...) different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed. (shrink)

According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...) insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance. (shrink)

The entry is intended as an advanced introduction to the topic of knowledge-how. It starts with a list of overviews, monographs and collections, followed by selected 20th century discussions. The last two sections contain sources pertaining to Ryle's own work on the topic as well as work by other influential thinkers, and themes that are sometimes associated with knowledge-how. The remaining seven sections survey the contemporary literature on knowledge-how from three perspectives: (i) generic desiderata for accounts of knowledge-how, (ii) specific (...) topics that are already well-entrenched in the tradition of particular subdisciplines and (iii) second-order controversy regarding distinct assumptions and tools employed by the debaters. (shrink)

Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy (...) and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti- intellectualist’s sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed. (shrink)

The paper discusses the philosophy of language and communication based on Immanuel Kant’s transcendental method. Firstly, the basic assumptions of methodical rationalism are presented. Subsequent sections analyse Kant’s intellectual successors: Wilhelm von Humboldt and Ernst Cassirer. Both the intellectuals adopted Kant’s point of views and both treated language as an active, cultural factor participating in the creation of reality. The article ends with a suggestion that the transcendental approach will be present in the 21th-century researches on language and communication.

Joseph Maria Hoene Wroński, mathematician and philosopher of Slavonic descent, is author of numerous work written in French, which, as he supposed, could have incited a renewal of human knowledge, and could also point the way to better living of humanity.